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COMMENTS
PLEDGED SECURITIES-THE PLEDGEE'S DUTY
TO PRESERVE VALUE UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Corporate stocks and bonds are quite commonly pledged as
collateral for secured loans.' However, problems can arise in
these transactions where the pledgor's stocks and bonds are in
the possession of the secured pledgee. Action may have to be
taken to convert or redeem convertible bonds or debentures 2 in
the pledgee's possession. Common stock may fluctuate in value
due to factors relating to the issuing company or because of
general market conditions. The secured party in possession of
the collateral may wish to act to improve or protect his position
as creditor. More importantly, the borrower-pledgor may desire
to sell or exchange the securities involved in order to prevent
or limit his financial losses. In all these situations there may
be a problem either because of the pledgee's failure to act or
because of his unwillingness to cooperate with the pledgor's
wishes.
The duties of a pledgee are set out in section 9-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.3 Unfortunately, the section and the
accompanying official comments do not deal directly with the
problems created by the use of securities as pledged collateral.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the application of
1. See, e.g., 1A BENDER'S U.C.C. SERv. § 14.01[1], at 1502 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as BENDER].
2. A debenture is a bond which carries with it the privilege of conversion or exchange for the common stock of the company at a fixed price. If the price of the
common stock increases beyond that fixed price, the market price of the debenture will
increase accordingly. Some debentures also have a redemption feature which permits
the issuer to redeem the bond at face value (or at a slight premium) prior to maturity.
See P. WYCKOFF, DIcTIONARY OF STOCK MARKET TERMs 46, 65 (1964).
3. (1) A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in his possession. In the case of an instrument or chattel
paper reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against
prior parties unless otherwise agreed.

(3) A secured party is liable for any loss caused by his failure to meet any
obligation imposed by the preceding subsections but does not lose his security
interest.
U.C.C. § 9-207. Unless otherwise indicated all references will be to the 1972 version of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
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the Uniform Commercial Code to this area of financial dealing
in an effort to synthesize a formula which describes the duty
of a pledgee of securities.

I.

THE CODE -

WHERE THE QUESTIONS ARISE

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to security interests created in a variety of types of personal property,
including "instruments." 4 The term "instruments," in turn, is
defined to include "securities," 5 such as stocks,6 convertible
debentures,7 and stock warrants and bearer bonds.8 Under the
1972 version of the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest in "instruments" can be perfected under the Code only,
with one exception,I if the secured party has possession.' 0 Thus,
when stocks or bonds are used as collateral, the transaction
must take the form of a "pledge.""
Section 9-207 defines the rights and duties of a secured
party who has possession of the collateral. Subsection (1) states
the general rule: "A secured party must use reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral in his possession. In
the case of an instrument or chattel paper reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior
4. Id. § 9-102(1).
5. Id. § 9-105(1)(i). The 1977 version of the Code further defines a "certificated
security" as follows:
A "certificated security" is a share, participation, or other interest in property
of or an enterprise of the issuer or an obligation of the issuer which is
(i) represented by an instrument issued in bearer or registered form;
(ii) of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or exchanges or
markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as
a medium for investment; and
(iii) either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or
series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations.
U.C.C. § 8-102(I)(a) (1977).
6. E.g., Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Otis Oil & Gas Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1383, 1385
(D. Colo. 1968).
7. E.g., Traverse v. Liberty Bank &Trust Co., 5 UCC REP. SFRv. 535 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 1967).
8. E.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 259 F. Supp. 513, 516
(E.D. Mich. 1966).
9. U.C.C. § 9-204(1). The exception is the 21-day period of perfection available
when the instrument is delivered for sale or exchange. Id. § 9-304(5)(b).
10. The 1977 Code amendments created additional exceptions in limited circumstances. See U.C.C. § 8-313, 8-321 (1977).
11. "A pledge is a bailment of personal property to secure an obligation of the
bailor." R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 128, at 622 (2d ed. 1955). See
also REsrATEMENr OF SECUmTY § 1 (1941).

1979]

U. C.C. § 9-207

parties unless otherwise agreed."" None of the more specific
provisions apply to investment securities.
The first sentence contains the basic proposition of the section.1 3 Difficulty arises in applying this sentence because
"reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral"
is not defined in the Code." Further, although the standards
by which it is to measured may be determined by agreement
between the parties, the general duty of the pledgee to exercise
"reasonable care" may not be waived. 5 Thus, the duties of the
pledgee will continue to depend upon what constitutes
"reasonable care" and " 'reasonable care' will continue to be
what the judges say it is."'8
The second sentence of subsection 9-207(1) applies only
when certain intangibles are involved. Where the collateral is
an instrument or chattel paper, the pledgee must take
"necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless
otherwise agreed." 17 Since the Code uses the words "prior parties," which suggests a negotiable instruments situation, it is
not particularly helpful when investment securities are
pledged." It is unclear whether the sentence is meant to be
exclusive in defining what "reasonable care" involves for pledgees of intangibles. Further, this express duty will not exist
where it is "otherwise agreed." Thus, a great deal of uncertainty is built into the Code section by its own terms.
The official comments to section 9-207 add further guidance, but still leave much uncertainty. Comment 1 indicates
that, "Subsection (1) states the duty to preserve collateral imposed on a pledge at common law."" The comment also directs
the reader to sections 17 and 18 of the Restatement of Security,
which is an authoritative statement of the pre-Code common
law. 0 Section 17 provides for a general "duty of reasonable
12. U.C.C. § 9-207(l).
13. 2 G. GILMORE, SEC URTy INTERESTS INPERSONAL PROPERTY § 42.2, at 1129 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Gilmore].
14. Comment, Duty of a Pledgee under Section 9-207, 10 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L.
REv. 301 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Duty of a Pledgee].
15. U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
16. GILMoRE, supra note 13, § 42.2, at 1130. See also Duty of a Pledgee, supra note
14, at 301-02 n.8.
17. U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
18. GiLMoRE, supra note 13, § 42.3, at 1135.
19. U.C.C. § 9-207, Comment 1.
20. GILMoRE, supra note 13, § 42.1, at 1129 n.4.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:391

care" for pledgees in possession of collateral. 2' One of the comments to that section defines "reasonable care" as "that which
a reasonable man under like circumstances would recognize as
necessary to prevent his conduct from creating an unreasonable
risk of harm to the pledgor's chattel." 2 Although another comment indicates that, "The rule of reasonable care expressed in
this Section is confined to the physical care of the chattel,''
it also indicates that the pledgee "has other duties in certain
circumstances" 24 and refers to section 18 of the Restatement of
Security.
Section 18 provides that, "Where instruments representing
claims of the pledgor against third persons are pledged, the
pledgee has the duty of using reasonable diligence to preserve
and collect the claims or to enable the pledgor to undertake
such preservation and collection." Just as with the second
sentence of section 9-207, these provisions are not clearly applicable to pledges of investment securities because they use
terms suggesting negotiable instruments. Furthermore, one of
the comments expressly provides that, "The pledgee is not
liable for a decline in the value of pledged instruments, even if
timely action could have prevented such decline. 26 However,
the same comment notes that the duty imposed by this section
"isin addition to the rule of reasonable physical care stated in
§ 17" and the section certainly does indicate that the duty of
the pledgee extends beyond mere physical maintenance.
Again drawing from the Restatement of Security," the comments to section 9-207 do make one specific suggestion as to
how a pledgee may be able to fulfill his duty of reasonable care:
"In many cases a secured party. . . may satisfy this duty by
notifying the debtor of any act which must be taken and allow21. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 17 (1941).

22. Id. § 17, Comment b.
23. Id. § 17, Comment a. This is the first line of defense for the lender who is being
sued for a loss not caused by physical deterioration of the collateral. See, e.g., Dubman
v. North Shore Bank, 85 Wis. 2d 819, 271 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1978).
24. RESTATEMENT OF SEcuRITY § 17, Comment a (1941).
25. Id. § 18.
26. Id. § 18, Comment a.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 18, Comment a, reads in part: "If the pledgee
makes it possible by notice and other action appropriate in the circumstances, for the
pledgor to enforce pledged instruments, the pledgor cannot complain of the pledgee's
non-action."
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ing the debtor to perform such act himself."29 Professor Gilmore suggests that this option to notify modifies both the duty
to physically maintain the collateral as well as the duty to
preserve actions against third parties. 0 Presumably, it would
also apply to the unique duties of the pledgee of investment
securities.
It is apparent that the pledgee's duty under the Code is
somewhat amorphous where investment securities are involved. The nature of the collateral may be part of the reason.
Unlike tangible goods, securities have a value which is usually
not closely related to their physical condition or form. The
rights of the owner or holder against third parties assume a
greater significance, as in the case of negotiable instruments.
However, the Code makes no special provision for the preservation of these rights by the creditor-pledgee of investment securities. Thus, a party seeking to impose such a duty on a pledgee
must rely on an expansive definition of "reasonable care"
under section 9-207.
The issue as to the scope of the duty of a pledgee of investment securities arises in two types of situations. In both, action
may be required of the pledgee in order to preserve the value
of the collateral. The first type of situation involves action in
the nature of an exchange, such as the conversion of bonds into
stock or the exchange of stock pursuant to a reorganization or
merger. 3 1 The conversion or exchange may be mandatory or
optional.
Section 21 of the Restatement of Security32 (which is not
referred to in the Code comments) deals with the situation
where action is required, but where there is a choice of alternatives. For example, in the case of convertible debentures called
for redemption, they must either be converted or redeemed.
The Restatement section provides that the pledgor may exercise the choice and that the pledgee is to "perform any act
33
within his power which is necessary to effectuate this choice.
Furthermore, where only the pledgee knows of the necessity for
changes, he has a duty to notify the pledgor.3 4 However, where
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

U.C.C. § 9-207, Comment 1.
GILMORE, supra note 13, § 42.4, at 1136.
Id.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 21 (1941).
Id. § 21(1).
Id. § 21(2).
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the pledgor refuses or neglects to choose, the pledgee's choice
3
of action is binding on the pledgor.
Section 21 does not apply where the change is merely optional; a pledgor in that situation may not compel the pledgee
to act.3 6 The scope of the pledgee's duty where action is permissive is unclear, because "reasonable men might differ on its
advisability." 37 Pre-Code case law produced a split of authority
in this regard. The apparent majority espoused the position
that a creditor would not be obligated to take -affirmative action "when it would require the expenditure of funds or the
3'
assumption of risks or performance of burdensome acts. 1
Other courts, however, imposed a duty to act if the very nature
of the collateral required it.3 9 Thus, neither the Code nor preCode common law is clear on who has the ultimate power of
decision in such situations. 0
Even in the case of actions which are required, the Code
does not expressly provide whether it is the pledgee or pledgor
who is to take the action called for. It is suggested that a duty
on the part of the pledgee may be implied from the rule of the
second sentence of section 9-207(1). "It seemes [sic] reasonable . . to take the negotiable instrument formula of. . . § 9207(1) as illustrative of the types of action which may have to
be taken against third parties, without a nice regard to whether
the particular action is well described as a step in preserving
rights against a prior party." 4 ' Even so, the parameters of such
a duty are still without definition.
As mentioned earlier, the comments to section 9-207(1) suggest that notifying the pledgor and allowing him to act can
discharge the duties of a pledgee. This would seem to be a
convenient method of satisfying the pledgee's duty of reasonable care in the convertible debentures cases. However, a secured party who turns a stock or bond over to the debtor for
such purposes as presentment or registration of transfer will
2
retain a perfected interest for only twenty-one days thereafter.
35. Id. § 21(3).
36. Id. § 21, Comment a.
37. GILMORE, supra note 13, § 42.3, at 1134.
38. Murray, Secured Transactions-Defensesof Impairment and Improper Care of
Collateral, 79 COM. L.J. 265, 270 (1974).
39. Id.
40. GILMORE, supra note 13, § 42.3, at 1134.
41. Id. § 42.3, at 1135.
42. See id. § 42.4, at 1136.
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Thus, notifying the pledgor and allowing him to act may not
be advisable for a pledgee of investment securities if he is not
certain he will regain possession within twenty-one days.
Applying section 9-207(1) to the second type of problem
situation in investment security pledges is even more difficult
because there is virtually no Code language to rely upon. This
is the situation where, because of a decline in the value of the
collateral due to market forces, action is appropriate to limit
the pledgor's losses. As mentioned earlier, under common law,
the pledgee was not liable for the mere decline in the market
value of the security. 3 Where the pledgee fails to take such
action, the pledgor may seek to impose liability, not for the
decline in the market value of the securities, but for the pledgee's failure to assist the pledgor in limiting his losses. Courts
have had difficulty in attempting to define the duty of the
pledgee in this second type of situation because of the highly
discretionary nature of the action.
Several of the questions raised by the two situations described above are left unanswered by the Code and the preCode common law. Consequently, the task of providing answers to these questions under the Code has devolved upon the
courts.
II.

THE COURTS' ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS

All of the cases decided under section 9-207 have fallen into
the two types of problem categories outlined above. Most of the
cases dealing with the first type of situation where action in the
nature of an exchange is called for have involved convertible
debentures pledged as collateral which were called for redemption. Since the price of the underlying common stock into
which the debentures could have been converted exceeded the
face value of the debentures, the pledgee's failure to exercise
the conversion privilege resulted in an obvious financial loss to
the pledgor. Because the appropriate response by the pledgee
is rather clear in such cases, the arguments for finding liability
for his failure to take the appropriate steps are relatively
strong.
However, in the second type of situation where the pledgor
requests the return of the collateral so that he can limit his
43.

RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §

18, Comment a (1941).
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losses in the market, the appropriate response on the part of
the pledgee is not as obvious because the results of a given
choice cannot be predicted with certainty. Consequently, the
reasons for imposing liability are not as strong. These differences in the factual settings of the cases may explain, in part,
why the courts have arrived at diverse answers to the questions
not answered by the Code.
A. More Than a Duty to Preserve Form
A prerequisite to imposing liability on the pledgee in these
cases is the conclusion that his duty of "reasonable care" includes a duty to act to preserve value in some circumstances.
A majority of the courts applying section 9-207 have interpreted "reasonable care" to encompass a duty to preserve
value. However, the courts do not agree on how to justify this
finding of duty or how to define its precise nature.
1. The Convertible Debenture Cases
The courts are divided on the basis of the duty to preserve
value in the convertible debenture case. In Traverse v. Liberty
Bank & Trust Co.4 1 the court recognized a duty to preserve
value noting that, "[T]he holder of commercial paper on
pledge was responsible for more than the physical preservation
of the paper" under the common law.45 The court did not rely
upon the second sentence of section 9-207 in finding this extended duty of reasonable care. "The process of charging endorsees can in no case lessen the value of the instrument on
which their names appear. But conversion from debt to equity
• . .can result in damage to the value of the collateral. Certainly there cannot be a duty on a pledgee to convert in all
cases . ...46
Relying on common law, the court applied a flexible definition of reasonable care, "taking into account all of the circumstances of the pledge and the character of the property
pledged. 4 7 However, the court attempted to remain close to
the idea of physical preservation by relating value to form. "In
the instant case, after the notice of call, it became impossible
44. 5 UCC REP. SERV. 535 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1967).
45. Id. at 539. See also RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 18 (1941).
46. 5 UCC REP. SFav. at 539 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 539 (citing Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 156 Miss. 842, 127 So.
291 (1930)).
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for the pledgee to hold the property precisely in its original
form. Either the debentures had to be changed to stock...
or to non-convertible debentures of low value .... "I By finding the duty to preserve value in the general definition of reasonable care and by relating it to the duty to preserve form, the
court allowed the pledgee some discretion. The court only required the pledgee to use good judgment in fulfilling his duty
of reasonable care.
In another convertible debentures case, Grace v. Sterling,
Grace & Co., 9 the court also found that, "Where commercial
paper or other securities are placed in the custody and control
of the pledgee, it is clear that his responsibility is not limited
solely to the physical preservation of the same." 50 In contrast
to Traverse, the court based the pledgee's duty to preserve
value on the negotiable instrument language of section 9-207.
[W]here bearer or negotiable instruments, taken as collateral, mature before the payment of the secured indebtedness,
the pledgee is required. . . to take such action as reasonable
prudence suggests to preserve the value of the collateral
... . By analogy, it follows that where pledged convertible
debentures are called at par . . he may be required in the
exercise of reasonable care to do more than just stand by and
wait for payment of the face value of the securities.'
Although the language of the second sentence of section 9-207
is mandatory, the court did not impose a duty on the pledgee
to act in all circumstances. Instead the pledgee was only required "to take such action as reasonable prudence suggests."
Reed v. CentralNational Bank" relied on the Grace decision's negotiable instruments rationale and adopted the same
definition of reasonable care. 3 However, Siedman v. Merchant's Bank-" refused to base the pledgee's duty in a convertible debentures case on the preservation of rights language of
section 9-207. "Where other rights, such as conversion, are con48. 5 UCC REP. SERV. at 540.
49. 30 App. Div. 2d 61, 289 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1968). See also 37 CIN. L. REv. 833 (1968).
50. 30 App. Div. 2d at 64, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
51. Id. at 64, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
52. 421 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1970) (also a convertible debentures case). See also 59
GA. L.J. 240 (1970).
53. The rule was also noted in Brodheim v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 75 Misc. 2d
285, 347 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (pledgee held not liable on other grounds).
54. 7 UCC REP. SERV. 881 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
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cerned, the duties imposed by law differ. There is no absolute
duty on the part of the pledgee to make an exchange of one
security for another. ' 55 Apparently relying on the general reasonable care duty of section 9-207, the court imposed a duty to
preserve value dependent upon the circumstances of each case.
Whether there is a duty on the pledgee either to make the
conversion itself without notice or to make it with notice; or
to advise the pledgor of the advisability of doing so, or to
advise the pledgor of the circumstances, . . . which affect the
value of the collateral, depends in the final analysis on the
circumstances of each case.56
Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. v. Bryant57 involved a fact
situation analagous to the convertible debenture cases. In that
case a bank had failed to return stock warrants 8 to the pledgor
prior to their expiration date. The court refused to find "that
the Bank had any specific duty to sell or otherwise dispose of
the worthless warrants" 5 and held that "the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code have not cast an absolute duty
upon the Bank." 0 However, the court did recognize a duty to
preserve value and that the provisions of the Code were to aid
"the trial court and the parties in developing the standard of
care."" '
Thus, the convertible debentures cases all impose a duty to
preserve value on the pledgee of investment securities. The
cases are split, however, on whether to base the duty on the
reasonable care language of the first sentence of section 9-207
or on an analogy to the negotiable instruments language in the
second sentence of that section. In either event the courts do
not impose a strict duty to act upon the pledgee in these situations, but are willing to impose liability only when the circumstances indicate that a prudent pledgee should have acted.
55. Id. at 883.
56. Id. at 883-84.

57. 271 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
58. A stock warrant is a "privilege granted by a corporation which gives the holder
the right to purchase a specific number of shares of stock. . . at a certain price until
a stipulated future date. Warrants may have a market value, particularly a speculative
value, based on a possible rise in price of the stock named in the warrant." P. WYCKOFF,
DICTIONARY OF STOCK MARum TERMS 264 (1964).
59. 271 So. 2d at 193.

60. Id.
61. Id.
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2.

The Market Decline Cases
As might be expected, in the cases involving the pledgee's
failure to take affirmative action in the marketplace, the courts
display a greater reluctance to recognize and apply a duty to
preserve value. In Hutchison v. Southern CaliforniaFirst National Bank, 12 the pledgor, who was in default, sought the pledgee's consent to a complicated stock and stock option transaction. The court held as a matter of law that the pledgee's refusal to consent did not constitute a failure to exercise reasonable care, "assuming, without deciding," that the pledgee's duty
was as expansive as some of the earlier cases had held."
On facts similar to those in Hutchison the federal district
court in Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Production Metals
Corp.6" came to an almost identical conclusion. Rejecting apparently inconsistent prior state law, 5 the district court assumed, but did not decide, that the New Jersey courts would
interpret section 9-207 of the U.C.C. "to impose upon a pledgee
the duty of exercising reasonable care in the preservation of the
value of collateral in his possession." 6 However, the court
found that the circumstances of the case justified the bank's
refusal to cooperate with the pledgor67
The federal court's prediction about the New Jersey court
was not entirely accurate. In New Jersey Bank v. Toffler,68 the
court read section 18 of the Restatement of Security as placing
the burden of preserving value on the pledgor. The court relied
on the comment to that section mentioned earlier that, "The
pledgee is not liable for a decline in the value of pledged instruments, even if timely action could have prevented such decline." 9 On the other hand, the court concluded that, "[Ojur
law does not hold a pledgee responsible for a decline in the
market value of securities pledged to it as collateral absent a
showing of bad faith or a negligent refusal to sell after demand."70 Although the opinion is not clear, it seems to indicate
62. 27 Cal. App. 3d 572, 103 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1972).
63. Id. at 582, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
64. 366 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
65. Id. at 617 (citing Franklin Trust Co. v. Goerke, 116 N.J.L. 529, 185 A. 39
(1936)).
66. 366 F. Supp. at 618-19.
67. Id. at 619.
68. 139 N.J. Super. 161, 353 A.2d 116 (1976).
69. RasTATSmF.NT OF SEcuRrrY § 18, Comment a.
70. 139 N.J. Super. at_, 353 A.2d at 118.
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that there may be a duty for the pledgee to act in some cases.
However, because neither exception was present in that case,
the court did not explain what the duty was or what would
constitute bad faith or negligence.
The Wisconsin case of Dubman v. North Shore Bank,7' like
Hutchison and Production Metals, also involved a pledgee
bank's refusal to cooperate in a complex stock transaction.
This court did not follow Grace and subsequent cases recognizing a duty to preserve the value of collateral . 2 However, the
facts of the case made it unnecessary for the court to decide
whether the duty of reasonable care should include such a
duty, because the bank's action was reasonable, even under the
proposed preservation of value analysis.73
In Capos v. Mid-America NationalBank74 the pledgee bank
had simply failed to sell pledged corporate stock when it was
declining in value. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit specifically held that "a bank has no duty to its borrower
to sell collateral stock of declining value. '75 The court noted
that the negotiable instrument language of section 9-207(1) and
of the Restatement of Security would not "appear to have any
pertinence to the mere diminution in market value of securities.""6 However, in dicta distinguishing the Grace and Reed
cases, the court did indicate that the failure to exercise conversion rights might fall within the duty of care set forth in the
second sentence of section 9-207(1)."
Although not as clear as the convertible debenture cases,
the majority of cases involving the pledgor's request for the
return of his collateral certainly do not appear to reject the
proposition that the duty section 9-207 imposes when securities
are collateral encompasses more than the mere physical preservation of the pledged property. However, all of the cases decided under section 9-207 recognize that the pledgee must be
able to exercise discretion in fulfilling his duty of reasonable
care under that section. Consequently, many factors are rele71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

85 Wis. 2d 819, 271 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 824-25, 271 N.W.2d at 151.
Id. at 825-27, 271 N.W.2d at 151-52.
581 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id. at 681.
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vant in determining whether the pledgee has breached his duty
of care.
B. Effect of the Pledgor'sDemand
Whether or not the pledgor had made a demand for the
pledgee to perform some act to preserve the value of the collateral was central to the imposition of liability in many of the
cases decided under section 9-207.
1. The Convertible Debentures Cases
In the cases involving convertible debentures the necessity
for action on the part of the pledgee is brought about by the
issuing corporation calling to redeem the securities. A pledgeebank can learn of this either through announcements made by
the issuer of the debentures or from the pledgor himself. Where
the securities are in bearer form the issuer cannot send notification directly to a holder and the announcement is generally
made in financial publications, such as the Wall Street
Journal.
In the first three cases mentioned above, the pledgee was
held liable for failing to convert into stock the debentures
called for redemption without any apparent regard for whether
the pledgor had demanded that the securities be converted.
In Traverse, the evidence was in dispute as to whether the
pledgor had given notice to the bank, and the court made no
finding in that regard." In Grace the pledgor of the securities
was traveling abroad when the notice of redemption was given
and made no demand on the pledgee to convert the debentures. 71 In Reed the position of the pledgor was even stronger
80
"because he took affirmative action to obtain conversion."
In the other two convertible debenture cases discussed
above, the pledgee was not held liable because the security
agreement had modified the duty of care.8 ' However, in both
cases the court commented on the pledgee's failure to demand
that the securities be converted. In Brodheim the court indicated that the pledgor's contributory negligence would bar re78. 5 UCC REP. SERV. at 538.
79. 30 App. Div. 2d at 61, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
80. 421 F.2d at 117.
81. Brodheim v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 75 Misc. 2d 285, 289, 347 N.Y.S.2d 394,
397 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Siedman v. Merchant's Bank, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 881, 885 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1970).
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covery since he "was an experienced investor, who kept himself
informed of events in the securities market. 82 Similarly, in
Siedman the court noted that the pledgor had access to the
same financial journals as the pledgee. "Thus, [the pledgor],
a businessman accustomed to handling documents, must be
charged with the same knowledge of what he claims defendant
should have known. Even had [the pledgee] . . .been negligent, [pledgor's] negligence would bar this action.""3
The stock warrants case, TallahasseeBank, also presented
an issue of contributory negligence. There, the pledgor had
asked the pledgee to return all of the pledged warrants prior to
their expiration date. For some reason the bank failed to return
1000 of the warrants. However, the pledgor had records in his
possession which would have disclosed this error. The court
ruled that the issue was properly submitted to the jury and
affirmed the judgment against the pledgee. 4
No conclusion can be drawn from these cases about the
effect of a pledgor's demand that the pledgee convert called
securities. The pledgor's failure to make a demand appeared to
be less important in the earlier cases imposing a stricter duty
of care on the pledgee. But the issue of contributory negligence
considered in the later cases suggests that the pledgor can improve his position by making a demand.
2.

The Market Decline Cases
In the cases involving the pledgee's failure to take affirmative action to limit the pledgor's losses, the necessity to sell is
created by the movement of the market. Here, notice of the
decline in value will come to the pledgee either through his own
observation of the market or from the pledgor who requests
that the pledgee cooperate in attempts to limit losses in the
value of the collateral. This situation differs from that in the
convertible debenture cases in that there is no obvious need for
action. While their value may fluctuate, the pledged securities
will remain in their current form and any decision to act on the
part of the pledgee would be highly discretionary.
In these situations the common-law rule favored the pledgee: "Before the maturity of the claim secured by the pledge
82. 75 Misc. 2d at 288, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
83. 7 UCC REP. SEav. at 885.
84. 271 So. 2d at 193-94.
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the pledgee has no duty to sell pledged chattels at the request
of the pledgor." 5 Under this rule the pledgee would never have
to cooperate with the pledgor in limiting losses. There is a
question, however, whether this conflicts with the pledgee's
duty to act to preserve the value of the pledgor's collateral in
some circumstances.
In three of the cases discussed above, Production Metals,
Hutchison and Dubman, the pledgor sought to have the pledgee cooperate in his plans to limit his own losses. In all three
cases the courts imposed no obligation on the pledgee to relinquish control of the collateral where its value was less than the
amount of the underlying obligation. 6 In Production Metals,
however, the court hinted at a change in the common-law rule,
"[C]onsidering the unnecessary, and sometimes catastrophic,
financial losses that a pledgor can be forced to incur by a narrow application of both the Code and common law rules." ' The
court considered the duty to preserve value to include compliance with a request to sell where the value of the collateral
exceeded the amount of the debtor's entire obligation. 8 It
should be noted that only in Dubman was the pledgor not in
default at the time of the demand.
In the two market decline cases where no demand was
made, the courts were extremely reluctant to impose a duty to
preserve value on the pledgee. Relying on two pre-Code cases,
the court in New Jersey Bank ruled that a pledgee would not
be liable unless there had been a demand by the pledgor with
which the pledgee had negligently' or in bad faith refused to
cooperate.89 The court in Capos cited another reason for not
finding a duty to sell in the absence of a demand by the pledgor. Such a duty would place the pledgee in the role of an
investment adviser and there is. "nothing harsh or unrealistic
about requiring a borrower/investor to contract for investment
advice if he wishes to receive it." 9
85.

RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY

§ 52 (1941). The comment adds that, "[The ple-

dgee] need not permit an acceleration of satisfaction nor any change in security at the
request of the pledgor." Id. Comment a. The illustrations to a section dealing with
corporate stock declining in value all conclude that the pledgee is not liable.
86. 366 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa.1973); 27 Cal. App. 3d 572, 103 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1972);
85 Wis. 2d 819, 271 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1978).
87. 366 F. Supp. at 618.
88. Id.
89. 139 N.J. Super. at_. 353 A.2d at 118.
90. 581 F.2d at 681.
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Thus, the market decline cases clearly indicate the importance of a timely demand on the part of the pledgor. Unlike the
convertible debentures cases, simple awareness of the market
decline will not impose the duty on the pledgee to act. Several
of these cases imply the importance of the value of the collateral in relation to the amount of the debt. Although all of these
cases refused to require action by the pledgee where the collateral had declined in value below the amount of the obligation,
Production Metals suggested that the courts might be willing
to ease the restrictiveness of the common-law rule where the
collateral was worth more than the amount of the debt.
C. Limitations on the Pledgee's Duty
The Uniform Commercial Code suggests two ways in which
the pledgee's duty to exercise reasonable care can be limited
by agreement between the parties. First, although the duty of
reasonable care cannot be disclaimed entirely, the standards
by which performance of the duty is to be measured can be
prescribed by agreement unless they are "manifestly unreasonable."9 Also, the second sentence of 9-207 allows the parties to
agree to eliminate the pledgee's duty to take "necessary steps
to preserve rights against prior parties. 91 2 Therefore, the language of the security agreement in pledge cases may significantly affect the rights and duties of the parties.
Thus, in Siedman the agreement contained the following
language which clearly conformed to the requirements of the
Code:
"The Bank's duty with reference to the Collateral shall be
solely to use reasonable care in the custody and preservation
of Collateral in its possession, which shall not include any
step necessary to preserve rights against prior parties nor the
duty to send notices, perform services, or take any action in
connection with the management of the Collateral."93
However, in two other cases there was a question as to
91. The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except

as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1976).
92. U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
93. 7 UCC REP. SFav. 881, 884 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
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whether the security agreement's limitation on the pledgee's
duty was permissible under the Code. In Brodheim the letter
agreement between the parties provided that, "You [the pledgee] shall have no responsibility for ascertaining any maturities, calls, conversions, exchanges, offers, tenders or similar
matters relating to any of the Security, nor for informing the
undersigned with respect to any thereof (whether or not you
have, or are deemed to have, knowledge)." 94 The pledgor challenged the agreement asserting that it attempted to completely
disclaim the pledgee's obligation of reasonable care. The court
rejected the argument, saying that the agreement "merely sets
the standards by which such due care is to be measured-that
is, the failure to notify plaintiff of a conversion call is not to be
considered lack of due care.""
An opposite result was reached in Reed. There, the security
agreement provided, "that the bank could substitute or exchange [collateral] and that it would not be liable 'on account
of any failure to present for payment, or collect by suit or
otherwise, any of the above described collateral.' -9 Notwithstanding the express language of the second sentence of section
9-207, the court held that the agreement constituted an improper disclaimer of the duty of reasonable care: "The security
agreement could modify this duty only by establishing standards of reasonable care . . . . In our opinion the provisions
purporting to exculpate the bank do not constitute such standards.""
These decisions indicate the importance of the security
agreement in the pledged securities cases. If drafted correctly,
the pledgee's duty of reasonable care can be limited extensively
by the security agreement. Thus, both parties should be aware
of the effect of the terms of the agreement.
The pledgee's duty to exercise reasonable care may also be
limited by action on the part of the pledgee after the agreement
has been executed. As mentioned earlier, the comments to section 9-207 suggest that the pledgee "may satisfy this duty by
notifying the debtor of any act which must be taken and allowing the debtor to perform such act himself."9 8 This possibility
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

75 Misc. 2d at 287, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
Id. at 288, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
421 F.2d at 115.
Id. at 117.
U.C.C. § 9-207, Comment 1.
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was referred to in the two earliest convertible debentures cases.
The court in Traverse noted that, "A pledgee could reasonably
fulfill this duty by notifying the pledgor and awaiting action or
instruction; and acting according to his own judgment should
these not be forthcoming within a reasonable time."9 In Grace
the court indicated that a subpledgee could have performed its
duty simply by notification. 0 Although this alternative appears to be more of an advantage in the convertible debentures
cases, it may be found to apply in other situations as well.
I.

THE COMMERCIAL SETTING-POSSIBLE SOURCE OF FURTHER
ANSWERS

The typical pledge transaction does not take place in a
vacuum. Besides the factors specifically dealt with in the Code
and the cases, the commercial setting in which these transactions usually occur may suggest other considerations which are
relevant in determining the duties of a pledgee under the Code.
For example, the fact that in nearly all of the cases discussed
the pledgees were institutions is important in determining the
duties which they may reasonably be expected to perform.
Such lenders take a number of factors into account before
they lend money to an individual: (1) the borrower's character
and reputation, (2) his present capital and future ability to
repay, (3) the purpose of the loan, (4) possible benefits to both
the borrower and the lender and (5) the terms of repayment.' °'
The purpose of secured lending is, in part, to compensate for
deficiencies in some of these areas. In the ideal secured loan the
value of the collateral will always exceed the amount due on
the loan so that the lender never loses the option of liquidating
the collateral to satisfy the debt.' 2
In order to protect itself in this way the lender must be
familiar with the collateral at the outset. Determining the original value of the collateral is easier in the case of investment
securities because market quotations are usually available. 3
However, the lender must also have some idea of the future
99. 5 UCC REP. SERv. at 541 (emphasis in original).
100. 30 App. Div. 2d at 68, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
101. Lott & Myers, Secured Lending, 28 MERCER L. REv. 699, 700 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Lott & Myers].
102. Id.
103. BENDER, supra note 1, § 14.0111]. See also Lott & Myers, supra note 101, at
717.
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market prospects for the securities in order to establish an
adequate margin between the amount of the loan and the value
of the collateral to protect itself both from possible market
fluctuations and from the costs and hazards of liquidating the
collateral. '04
In addition, some lending institutions protect themselves
by adopting firm internal policies governing maximum
amounts for loans collateralized by securities." 5 Federal Reserve Board regulations also place limits on loans taken out to
purchase or carry registered stock when they are secured, either
directly or indirectly, by the same or other such stock.1 8
Further, sound lending policy entails continued evaluation
and control of collateral during the term of the loan."0 7 In some
instances the Federal Reserve regulations require the lender to
demand either additional collateral or early payment in the
event of a market decline.10 8 With respect to control, a pledgee
of stock may have the stock transferred into its own name. '
Lenders can also establish systems for detecting stock splits or
stock dividends,110 and require that stock received as the result
111
of a dividend or split remain with the pledgee.
Another factor relevant in assessing the pledgee's duty to
cooperate with transactions proposed by the pledgor is its
rights upon default. Sales of registered securities are subject to
strict SEC regulations in a number of situations. ' Upon default, then, the lender might have far less freedom to sell than
is contemplated by the U.C.C.
Thus, the properly prepared lender is not operating in the
dark. From the outset it should have a fair amount of informa104. Lott & Meyers, supra note 101, at 701.
105. See, e.g., Traverse v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 5 UCC REP. SERv. 535 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1967); New Jersey Bank v. Toffler, 139 N.J. Super. 161, 353 A.2d 116 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1978) (brokers and dealers); Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1978) (banks); Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1978) (other
habitual lenders). See Harfield, Quagmire for Lending Officers: Loans on Pledged
Securities, 84 BANKING L.J. 283, 283-85 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Harfield]; BENDER,
supra note 1, § 14.05. See generally, Kelly & Webb, Credit and Securities:The Margin
Requirements, 24 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1969).
107. Lott & Myers, supra note 101, at 701, 717-18.
108. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Production Metals Corp., 366 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1973); New Jersey Bank v. Toffler, 139 N.J. Super. 161, 353 A.2d 116
(1976).
109. BENDER, supra note 1, §§ 14.02[4], 14.03[3]-[5].
110. Lott & Myers, supra note 101, at 717-18.
111. BENDER, supra note 1, §14.03[5].
112. See Harfield, supra note 106, at 293.
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tion about both the borrower and his collateral. Institutional
protections reduce the lender's exposure to risk even further.
Thus, in convertible debentures situations it may not be unreasonable to expect lenders to take the necessary steps. In market
decline cases it might be appropriate to require lenders to take
affirmative action, especially if their rights are uncertain upon
default.
DUTY
Only a small number of cases have dealt with the duty of
reasonable care of a pledgee of investment securities under
section 9-207. The section itself has provoked little critical
comment.1 13 However, because the case law that exists is difficult to reconcile, the remainder of this comment will attempt
to formulate a workable standard for the pledgee of investment
securities under the Code.
Naturally, a carefully drafted security agreement can solve
many of the problems created by the uncertainty regarding an
IV.

FORMULATING A WORKABLE

investment security pledgee's duties under section 9-207.114 The

Code allows the parties to define the standards of reasonable
care in the agreement unless the provisions are "manifestly
unreasonable.""' Furthermore, the second sentence of section
9-207 expressly provides that the parties can agree to eliminate
some of the pledgee's duties with respect to pledged instruments.' 6 The agreement should, of course, deal with the parties' rights with respect to voting, dividends and interest. However, the agreement should also define, to the greatest extent
possible, their respective rights and duties in special transactions, such as the conversion of corporate debentures.117 The
agreement might also include provisions concerning the rights
of the pledgor to act in the event of a decline in the market
value of the collateral. The only constraint is that the agree8
ment should be kept within the bounds of reason."1
Where there is no effective provision in the security agreement defining the duties of the pledgee, the less specific provi113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
42.3, at
118.
at 311.

The section was not amended in the 1972 revision of the Code.
Harfield, supra note 106, at 288.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1976).
U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
BENDER, supra note 1, §§ 14.03[3]-[5]. See also GILMORE, supra note 13, §
1134.
GILMORE, supra note 13, at § 42.2. See also Duty of a Pledgee, supra note 14,
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sions of section 9-207 apply. That the duty of a pledgee of
investment securities under that section extends beyond mere
physical preservation of the collateral seems fairly apparent
from the section itself, its comments and the few cases which
have been decided under it. However, the cases are not clear
on just how far this duty extends.
Naturally, in the vast majority of situations a pledgee of
investment securities can fulfill its duty of reasonable care,
including both the duty to preserve physical form and the duty
to preserve value, simply by holding the collateral in safekeeping. The Code and the cases decided under it have done nothing to change the common-law rule that a pledgee is not liable
for a mere decline in the market value of the collateral. However, in the relatively infrequent cases where there was no
doubt that action should have been taken, a pledgee has been
required to take affirmative steps to protect the value of its
security.
The convertible debentures cases seem to be the most common examples of such situations. There, the loss of value was
certain to occur and the advisability of conversion was obvious.
Based either on. the general definition of reasonable care under
the first sentence of section 9-207 or by analogy to the
"necessary steps" language of the second sentence, the courts
have been willing to impose liability in such situations. However, several courts have suggested that simple notification of
the pledgor will satisfy the pledgee's duty to act in such cases.
Furthermore, although it has never been dispositive, some
courts have hinted the failure of the pledgor to take action on
his own initiative might bar recovery from the pledgee in some
cases. Nevertheless, it seems likely that pledgees will still be
found liable in many cases where they fail to take obvious steps
to preserve the value of the collateral, especially where they
relied upon and were aware of the nature of the collateral in the
first instance.
In situations where some action is mandatory, but there is
a choice of alternatives, it seems likely that the common-law
rule will continue. The pledgee should be able to fulfill its duty
simply by notifying the pledgor and awaiting instructions. Absent such instructions, a pledgee should not be liable for action
taken responsibly and in good faith.
Where an even greater amount of discretion is involved, in
the market decline cases, the likelihood of a pledgee being held
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liable is much smaller. Under common law a pledgee had no
duty to accede to the pledgor's request for the sale or exchange
of collateral prior to maturity of the obligation. Even today
there is no indication that a pledgee will be held liable for the
failure to limit the pledgor's losses in the face of a market
decline where the pledgor makes no demand for such action.
However, Production Metals recognized the possibility of
serious financial loss to the pledgor in such situations and indicated that the pledgee may be bound to cooperate with the
plans of the pledgor where the value of the collateral exceeds
the amount of the debt. Nonetheless, where the collateral has
declined in value below the amount of the debt, the collateral
"may provide the only leverage available to encourage the
debtor to repay the debt in full." ' 9 Consequently, it may not
be reasonable to require the pledgee to consent to transactions
involving the collateral in such situations, but even this rule
should not be applied unwaiveringly. Where, for example, the
chance for a change in the downward trend of the market value
is remote and there is no chance for the pledgor to provide
additional security, waiting for default would only increase the
amount of the deficiency. In such situations a pledgee should
not be immune from liability for the refusal to exercise sound
business judgment, regardless of the relative values of the debt
and the security.
V.

CONCLUSION

The approach suggested above represents a moderate departure from the common-law rules. However, the departure is
not unreasonable in light of the commercial climate in which
these transactions take place. Nor is it contrary to the purposes
of the Code to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." ' The courts have suggested a
trend in this direction through decisions recognizing that the
duty of reasonable care includes the duty to take affirmative
steps to preserve value in some cases. Breach of the duty should
always be determined with reference to a standard of care
based on responsible, though not infallible, good faith judgment. Under such an approach the pledgee would not be subjected to haphazard liability, but the pledgor would not be
119. 366 F. Supp. at 618.
120. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1976).
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required to suffer financial hardship because of the pledgee's
arbitrary intransigence.
JAMES

H. GORMLEY, JR.

NoTe: After this article was prepared for publication, the Court of Appeals
decision in Dubman v. North Shore Bank was affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. 90 Wis. 2d 226, 279 N.W.2d 455 (1979). In dicta, it was stated, "This court would
agree that the Bank had a duty to act reasonably to preserve the value of collateral.
However, the defining of the scope of that duty is best left to a more appropriate case."
Id. at 234-35, 279 N.W. 2d at 459.
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